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Our article offers a vision of how collaborative processes of 
knowledge-making in an interdisciplinary faculty writing 
group can transform professional lives of isolation into ones 
that flourish. Central to our co-creation of knowledge are 
the practice of storytelling in a critical self-reflective manner and 
the elements of commitment, connection and relationship. 
Together we have found that these elements provide basic 
strategies for managing the isolation that would otherwise 
be a significant force in our working lives.
Our commitment is epistemological and moral, as we 
commit to knowledge-making, but also to each other as 
individuals and as moral agents, to our values, and to bringing 
our values into our work. Learning about ourselves 
together can enhance our sense of identity and our ability to 
navigate limits and boundaries.
Through supportive, intentional and reflective collaboration, 
we re-vision knowledge-making as fundamentally social 
and relational, and theorizing as grounded in the specificity 
of narratives of shared, lived experience.
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Transformation
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introduction
While many of us are brought to academia by a passion for our sub-
ject matter and a life of learning, the reality of living and working in 
the academy can be disconcerting and dispiriting, for all of us, as it 
has sometimes has been for the authors. The result can leave a person 
feeling disconnected, isolated, marginalized and somehow “not enough”. 
One of us has described the graduate school experience with the words 
“the best thing you are going to get is a lack of negative reinforce-
ment”. Sometimes the experience of being a faculty member is not much 
different. This sense of disconnection at times made us feel that our 
ability to theorize was insufficient, and that our ability to do our work, 
to know, was being hampered. We felt this in many ways: in feeling 
less competent than others, in feeling that we were not fitting into our 
professions as we should, or in suspecting that the topics and issues we 
felt were important to pursue did not garner the approval of our peers 
or were otherwise unacceptable. 
Each of us has experienced feeling isolated and like a person swim-
ming upstream; this has sometimes led to fearfulness, ambiguity, pain 
and (a sense of ) failure – certainly calling into question our sense of com-
petence in knowledge-making. This feeling of a “lack of fit” in a setting 
with discipline-specific paths/actions for “being a good teacher/scholar” 
or being successful might be likened to concerns with body image or 
body concept in a culture that has a set of ideals and pressures to urge 
us to achieve those ideals. In both cases, these “right paths” and “aes-
thetic ideals” constrict our picture of what is even possible and impose 
limitations on our beliefs (our knowing) and on us as whole persons. 
Sociologist Dorothy Smith articulates this issue in terms of experiencing 
“a contradiction in the relation of our discipline to our experience of 
the world”.1
Most of us understand our work as academics through the given 
philosophies, assumptions and practices of our disciplines and gradu-
ate school training. Typically, we do not consciously reflect upon ways 
in which we conduct ourselves in our everyday work lives. The path of 
least resistance allows us to rely on the routines established by custom 
and bureaucracy, and to respond to our environment rather than actively 
and thoughtfully creating it. What we have found is that when taking 
1  D. Smith, Women’s Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology, in: Femi-
nist Perspectives on Social Research, ed. S. Nagy Hesse-Biber, M.L. Yaiser, Oxford 
2004, p. 32.
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the well-worn path results in isolation and disconnection, a different 
project or path is needed. Again in Smith’s words, “transcending that 
contradiction means setting up a different kind of relation than that 
which we discover in the routine practice of our worlds”.2
In this essay we explore our writing group’s evolving sense of what 
our project of knowing might be (as individuals, as a group, and as it 
might be shared beyond ourselves). We suggest here that the practice 
and process of understanding ourselves and our institution(s) is worth 
articulating because it gives us important clues as to our way out of 
disconnection. Our epistemology, our project of knowing, is different 
from the traditional project(s) of knowing in the academy. It is conscious, 
collaborative, respectful, committed and reflective. It is also process rather 
than ideal driven; it is based on telling our stories, listening to each 
other and collectively sharing our knowledge and routes to knowing. 
Our project of co-knowing incorporates our experiences across our whole 
lives, not just our work as teacher/scholars. In addition, our project of 
knowing helps us to desire that knowledge-making be embedded in 
a commitment to each other as individuals and as moral agents, to our 
values (always under reexamination), and to bringing the results of 
our process of knowing into other places in our lives.
what we do: our Practice and its Practical and Philosophical 
dimensions
Co-writing and co-knowing in the academy can take many forms. 
A growing body of literature shows the importance of personal relation-
ships and interaction for the realization of creativity and knowledge pro-
duction.3 In this section, we provide specifics about our writing group 
that illustrate how our mutual relationships and interaction contribute 
to our knowing, a knowing we share well beyond our writing group. 
Through our practice of storytelling, listening and giving feedback (“advi- 
sing”), we live out our moral philosophy that commitment, community 
and the embrace of whole lives transforms knowing, working and living.
2  Ibid.
3  M.F. Belenky, B. McVicker Clinchy, N. Rule Goldberger, J. Mattuc 
Tarule, Women’s Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind, New 
York 1987. See especially ch. 6. Also see Feminist Epistemologies, eds. L. Alcoff, 
E. Potter, New York 1993; P. Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Conscious-
ness, and the Politics of Empowerment, New York 1991; J. Trebilcot, Ethics of Method: 
Greasing the Machine and Telling Stories, in: Feminist Ethics, ed. C. Card, Kansas 1991.
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Three of the five of us founded this scholarly writing group in 2000, 
immediately after each of the three received the doctoral degree. We 
wanted not only to achieve tenure and promotion at our institution but 
also to benefit our students, school and community through our passion 
and commitment, and to keep learning and creating. While we are not 
experts in group dynamics or interpersonal communication, our several 
years of refining this group process have led us to an understanding of 
how and why things have worked for us and, more importantly, why we 
are still committed to this group over ten years later. As we have lived 
out our values, we have learned through doing together at least one way 
of knowing and of sharing that knowing. 
We built and rebuilt our group by identifying people with at least two 
characteristics in common: exploring and creating exciting and useful 
knowledge, and perhaps needing some support. Because as individuals 
and as a group we spend significant time getting to know, questioning, 
learning about and reflecting on each member’s work, everyone’s intel-
lectual curiosity is engaged. Further, we think it important to include 
a diversity of scholarly styles and practices, thus widening the array of 
epistemologies.
The idea that each member needs some kind of support is, in some 
ways, obvious; if we did not need additional support, why would we 
be willing to invest so much time and energy and to make a long-term 
commitment to the group? A focus on need for support turns out to be 
group-serving as well as self-serving in that it inherently lays the neces-
sary foundation for long-term commitment. Commitment and com-
munity are key words in the ways of knowing we have discovered and 
continue to develop together.
In terms of group makeup, we happen to include female-bodied 
persons only, but this was not intentional at the beginning. Although we have 
identified a feminist lens as a component of what makes work interesting 
to us, in principle that does not exclude male-bodied colleagues. Over 
time, however, in our own case we recognized what we perceived  impor-
tant benefits in maintaining an all-women group. What was and still is 
intentional is that no two members come from the same department (we 
are in philosophy, health and wellness, economics, sociology and Spanish), 
as that would limit the various epistemologies from which each of us learns 
and produces. Moreover, we often share stories of specific personnel issues, 
which is a practical reason for not doubling departmental representation. 
In terms of an optimal number of group members, we have found that 
four or five works well, because of how it maximizes a group dynamic 
and expands the ways of knowing and thus producing new knowledge. 
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All of us are very busy people, teaching six to eight courses per year, 
serving as good campus citizens who often are doing more than our 
share of committee work, and juggling the interplay between personal 
and professional lives. The only way we believe we can stay active as 
scholars, or knowledge-makers, is to make the time to be scholars, and 
we are helped to do that in a community setting. 
The basic purpose of the group began as that of providing a space 
and time for each member to share her scholarly writing and ideas and 
to get feedback aimed at improving the work in both process and out-
come. We devote group time to listening to the presenter’s exploration 
and helping her narrow, expand, define and articulate the work. We 
have learned that sometimes the greatest contribution to generating 
knowledge is that of listening and giving feedback to our lists or plans 
and ideas for projects.
Over time, however, recognizing ourselves as whole persons and that 
our motivation for collaborative work is itself morally grounded, we have 
become much more than just a “scholarly writing” group.4 In addition 
to articles for conferences, journals and books, we also have helped each 
other write letters for tenure, promotion, sabbatical requests, recom-
mendations, and reports for committees, programs and departments. 
In addition, we have developed templates for these standard pieces of 
professional writing, which we share with other campus colleagues, 
whether at their request or at our suggestion, along with our actual letters 
for use as models. We also encourage strategizing and planning, talking 
about teaching issues and specific assignments, and processing campus 
services and politics. Attention to teaching and campus issues surfaced 
naturally as we shared our lives as scholars in a particular place. We do 
have objectives and guidelines – even rules – but we also give ourselves 
permission to be flexible. As we live out this group experience we seem 
to have settled on one basic rule or expectation: to provide whatever 
support any one of us needs to the extent that each of us is able and 
willing to do so. Commitment to our group, therefore, both in terms 
of process and outcome, is of primary importance.
Related to this concept of commitment, and perhaps of even greater 
importance than the activities named above, however, is the way we have 
created a space within the academy where we can bring our whole lives, 
4  This idea of collaborative work being morally motivated is articulated by 
David Wright and Susan Brajtman in the context of their work on relational knowing 
in interprofessional team nursing care. See Relational and Embodied Knowing: 
Nursing Ethics within the Interprofessional Team, “Nursing Ethics” 2011, no. 18(1), 
p. 20–30.
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including our personal peaks and valleys. This characteristic of our group 
cannot be separated from the knowledge we co-create; indeed, our mutual 
commitment to each other as whole persons, with a professional as well 
as a personal life, is the moral value that undergirds all of what we do.
How do we practice such commitment? It is primarily through tell-
ing our stories, listening to others’ stories, hearing responses and giv-
ing them. Because of the level of trust we have developed, each one of 
us can openly and as honestly as possible narrate what we have tried to 
do in a piece of writing, what we think we want to do but cannot quite 
articulate, why we cannot make a decision about what is a priority, 
why we believe we are qualified or not for a position, etc. Response to 
such fully engaged stories that often reveal deeper levels of conscious-
ness (or subconsciousness) than usually accessed, almost invariably elic-
its a deeper kind of hearing, a discernment of what really matters to 
the teller, to the whole person she is. Our commitment to each other 
far outreaches acceptance or belief in the abstract knowledge each one 
provides; rather, it is a commitment to the whole person, based on the 
knowledge that whole lives require moral knowing, acting and sharing.5 
We work frankly and with care; we ask and answer direct questions even 
when a response might be painful. A willingness to be criticized is not 
even enough; we expect each other to want sincerely both negative and 
positive feedback, because we believe that fertile grounds for growth 
and knowledge are often dark, dank and dreary. We negotiate. And we 
honor confidentiality: what is said or shared within the group stays in 
the group. In these ways, our knowledge-making practices involve a signi- 
ficant moral dimension.
Years ago, a member was on the verge of an emotional collapse that 
was sabotaging a manuscript she was preparing. In that case, the other 
group members refrained from posing questions, either personal or 
professional, but rather took over the session by discussing, chapter by 
chapter, the current draft, while the writer herself merely listened and 
took notes. This is a clear example of the kind of moral commitment 
5  The concept of the whole person we are relying on draws from the litera-
ture on narrative theory, e.g., S. Brison, Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of 
a Self, Princeton 2011; J. Herman, Trauma and Recovery, London 1992, 1997; 
and R. Culbertson, Embodied Memory Transcendence and Telling: Recounting Trauma, 
Re-establishing the Self, “New Literary History” 1995, no. 26.1, p. 169–195; and 
the literature on critical race theory, e.g., P. Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: 
Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, New York 1991; 
and M. Lugones, Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception, “Hypatia” 
1987, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 16.
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we have to each other, as it precludes the possibility of us walking away 
from each other rather than remaining present and supportive during 
emotional distress. But further, we made sure that the scholarly work 
continued, because this group member was working under a deadline. 
So we supported her not only in her personal difficulty, but also in 
the scholarly project that she herself was committed to. 
The member who came to the group shortly after returning to 
academics following 10 years in the non-profit (and start-up business) 
world reacted with surprise and delight in her first session of receiving 
feedback in the group. Whereas her boss’s editing had felt like negative 
criticism, what she experienced from the writing group was entirely dif-
ferent. She found it to be astute and critical, yes, but in a more global 
sense, accepting, understanding, encouraging and—above all—useful 
for further revising and developing.
More recently, during work on documents authored by the whole 
group, one member assertively proposed that instead of all five of us 
editing each section or paragraph, we should break into individuals 
or groups of two to tackle pieces of the work. Another member works by 
lists, projecting them on the screen or writing them on the blackboard 
so that her colleagues can suggest visual ways of prioritizing, grouping 
or even erasing certain points.
We agree with Wright and Brajtman that collaboration involves commu-
nicating in such a way that “the knowledge and skills of various team mem-
bers synergistically influence” the achievement of the group’s and members’ 
goals.6 Because we bring such different experiences, expertise, and approaches 
to learning and ways of knowing to the group, we also contribute in dif-
ferent ways to critiquing and revising writing. Several of us quickly grasp 
the holistic purpose of a piece and contribute by suggesting rearrange-
ment or deletion of sentences, whole paragraphs or sections, or by request-
ing further development of certain motifs. Others’ contributions revolve 
around more detailed grammatical and lexical issues. At one time or another, 
all of us skillfully suggest connections with prior or current work by the same 
or different author, at times even suggesting useful sources.
A unique characteristic of our practice is our deliberate choice to 
maintain a playfulness in our work. It’s not just that we have great senses 
of humor, but that we work to maintain an atmosphere that encour-
ages play in the midst of our serious work. As María Lugones says in 
her article, playfulness is an attitude that turns our activity into play.7 
6  D. Wright, S. Brajtman, Relational and Embodied Knowing, p. 21. 
7  Ibid., p. 16.
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It’s an attitude that emphasizes the excitement of discovery, and that 
encourages laughter rather than shame when we blunder. In playful-
ness, we employ gentle teasing right alongside direct critique, taking out 
the sting and replacing it with the assurance that we are all invested in 
the success of each member. Playfulness makes it easier to be wrong, to 
make mistakes, because we know we have the support of smart colleagues 
who will take our work seriously and have our interests at heart. In this 
attitude we can work openly, not worrying about competence or “get-
ting it right”, but being open to what knowledge we will come to. And 
playfulness can be feisty and irreverent, helping us remember that rules 
and norms are not sacred.
Lugones’ picture of playfulness includes a further aspect that we came 
to know on our own but also recognize in her description. She claims 
that playfulness is characterized by uncertainty, by “finding ambiguity 
and double edges a source of wisdom and delight”.8 Although we have 
not always been able to see uncertainty as a source of delight, we do 
realize that it is a rich field of possibility, a field in which, if we can learn 
to just be there, we may find important insight. For example, one of 
us has mined the chaos and ambiguity of personal trauma to articulate 
challenges to claims in traditional moral theory. The ability to wait and simply 
experience uncertainty rather than attempting to resolve it just to end 
its discomfort provides opportunities to discover new paths to knowing. 
We have termed this a “productive ambivalence”, and it seems clear that 
the ability to know through this ambivalence is strongly fostered by the 
stable ground of connection and commitment our group creates. It helps 
us avoid the kind of certainty that actually limits knowing by closing off 
questions with irrefutable answers. 
We are not the first scholar-professors to recognize the need to form 
a group such as ours or to act on that recognition. But, like so many others, 
we found early on that we simply had to create our own supportive structures to 
thrive in the academy – structures to help create knowledge in a different way. 
We do not like the ways the traditional stories of the academy limit us. Fur-
ther, we understand now that through collaborative work our stories shift and 
our picture of what is “true” changes. This picture is often ambivalent and not 
necessarily “correct”. We discovered that for us significant knowledge-making 
in the academy depends a great deal on our coming and being together. 
Based on how our lives, professional and personal, have been transformed 
through our co-writing and co-knowing, we eagerly share our stories with 
others wanting to get off the traditional path of solitary knowledge-making.
8  Ibid., p. 17. 
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how our Practice affects the epistemology of our work/ 
co-Knowing epistemology 
From separation to engagement
Work in feminist epistemology over the last several decades has opened 
new pictures of the world we live in, made rich with women’s lived 
experiences. In fact, a grounding in lived experience is one of the things 
these theories have in common, along with attention to epistemological 
aspects of relationship and connection.9 Yet another aspect that many 
such theories share is an emphasis on the notion of narrative, or storytel-
ling, as a form of theorizing more congenial to many women’s thinking. 
In particular, the early work of Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger and 
Tarule, in their volume Women’s Ways of Knowing, theorizes knowing in 
ways that our group unconsciously modeled in our own development 
as knowers.10 Here we tell a short story of our own knowing. 
The first of us who put our working/writing group together were 
relatively fresh out of graduate school, and consequently were still heavily 
influenced by the training we had received in the traditions of the acad-
emy, even though we all felt some need to resist those traditions. One 
of us had the good fortune of access to a graduate program in feminist 
theory, and thus had a more conscious and deliberate agenda regarding 
the desire to reject academic traditions. 
At this initial point in our group’s history, we could easily be 
described, in Belenky et al.’s terms, as separate knowers: that is, as persons 
trained to work at knowing as a project that is designed and intended 
to produce truth through a particular method. This method, of course, 
is the one preferred by the academy, at least in Anglo-American univer- 
sities. According to this method, truth is a matter of objective fact, 
and it is the goal of all knowing. Truth is the sign of knowing: it is the 
indicator that knowing is what has been achieved, as opposed to “mere” 
believing or, worse yet, opinion. Knowing, under this model, works 
by separation of self from the object to be known and is articulated in 
visual metaphors. To know is to see, and in order to see, there must be 
a distance (a separation) between the knower and the known. What is 
to be known, then, cannot be a part of the knower, but must be (at least 
conceptually) distinct.11
9  Feminist Epistemologies.
10  M.F. Belenky, B. McVicker Clinchy, N. Rule Goldberger, J. Mattuck 
Tarule, Women’s Ways of Knowing. See especially ch. 6. 
11  This raises interesting questions about the possibilities of self-knowledge. 
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To know, according to this model, the knower uses a methodological 
doubt, in the way Descartes did, to subject all possible objects of know-
ledge to strict epistemological evaluation. Such knowing assumes that 
each possible thing, each possible point of knowledge, must be challenged 
and inspected rigorously and in accord with some set of objective 
criteria, in order that its reality be proven beyond that initial procedural 
doubting. In this model, the claim for authority of knowledge rests on 
reason, and reason is justified through argumentation, itself expected to 
be an impersonal relating of evidence according to standards believed 
to be universal. 
In the language of the sciences, this model of knowing is sometimes 
described as “positivistic”, having “an emphasis on detachment, impar-
tiality, objectivity, prediction and control”. It is a model which “presumes 
detachment from context and denies the inseparability of the knower 
from the known”. Wright and Brajtman describe this model of natural 
science philosophy as maintaining a “paradigm of control, privileging 
detached observation and rational explanation”.12 
As new products of this model of knowing, we ourselves were highly 
trained in argumentation, in the use of impersonal reason to “prove” or 
at least justify our theories and knowledge claims. But we felt uneasy, 
because working by this model, knowing in this way, produced internal 
dissonance. We felt like separate knowers, and although we experi-
enced this as a success of a certain kind, in that it enabled us to join 
the academy as professionals, we also experienced this knowing as somehow 
wrong, or at least inadequate. 
Although we weren’t aware of it at the time, our group exemplified 
the kind of knowing that Belenky et al. described as separate, the knowing 
that is the model of the English-speaking academy, and we both used 
and resisted it at the same time. What we see now is that the group 
itself enabled our transformation as knowers, and as we became knowers 
in a different way, we became ourselves more fully. 
The distinction offered by Belenky et al. that makes most sense to us 
is the distinction between knowledge, which is conceived of as a matter 
of fact, and understanding, which is seen as a matter of engagement, 
intimacy and relation. Our writing group began with the intention of 
enabling us as new faculty to gain the approval of our peers and thus 
If there must be distance between knower and known, then how, and what, can 
I know about myself? Very little, presumably, in this model of knowledge, because 
that self-knowledge cannot be objective and thus doesn’t count as true knowledge. 
This problem in itself made us very uneasy. 
12  D. Wright, S. Brajtman, Relational and Embodied Knowing, p. 22.
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secure our positions. And we succeeded. Along the way, we realized that 
we were learning to know some other things. 
Because we responded relationally to each other as persons rather 
than simply as academics, we were able to shift our interactions to 
a fuller level. As we have indicated earlier, we took each other seriously 
as full persons with a full range of life projects and needs, and we made 
deliberate choices not to exclude any range of concerns from our group 
discussions and processing. This deepening of our relationships deep-
ened the possibilities for the knowing work, the epistemology, in which 
we engaged. We see ourselves in the descriptions of connected knowers 
that Belenky et al. offered: as engaged in a process directed at making 
meaning rather than producing truth, as deeply involved with the 
objects/subject matter of our studies rather than impersonal, as oriented 
toward discovery, sharing and support rather than toward judgment of 
arguments, as desiring inclusion and acceptance rather than control. 
This is the model of knowing that Belenky et al. call connected or 
relational, and it is a knowing that emphasizes a very different process 
from that of the traditional model of separateness and objectivity. 
In the model of connectedness, knowing as understanding is grounded 
in the lived experience of inescapable relatedness and in the further 
experience of that relatedness as something to be recognized and celeb-
rated rather than shunned. Connected knowers see their knowing as part 
of the social construction of self and world, recognizing that the pro-
cess they use brings them together with the thing they would know, and 
that consequently both they and the known are to some (however small) 
extent changed by the relation that such knowing constitutes. 
What is important to consider here is that the phenomenon of knowing, 
in this model, exhibits a number of features whose implications have tremen- 
dous potential for the world. We turn now to a discussion of some 
of these features that, although previously noted in the literature,13 
are worth revisiting. In doing so, we also name some of these features 
in our own experience of collective knowing, and offer some observa-
tions of our own that have grown out of this work.
Engagement, trust and agency
A connected model of knowing is an engaged model, but there are 
many different kinds of engagement, some of which will be preferable 
13 For engagement see S.L. Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value, 
Palo Alto 1988; for trust see A. Baier, Trust and Anti-trust, “Ethics” 1986, vol. 96, 
no. 2, p. 231–260 and for agency see D. Tietjen Meyers, Feminists Rethink the Self, 
Boulder 1997.
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over others. We will argue here that the preferred type of engagement 
for knowing is intimacy characterized by trust. This kind of intimacy is 
reflected in the embracing of fundamental values such as helping others 
and a commitment to holistic caring.14 To engage this way, it is crucial 
to recognize that knowing implies and requires both purpose and values. 
As Donna Haraway puts it, “some differences are playful; some are poles 
of world historical systems of domination. Epistemology is about knowing 
the difference”.15
Many feminists and critical race theorists have argued in support 
of the claim that knowledge is value laden rather than value neutral.16 
They argue that the supposedly objective and universal viewpoints of 
traditional epistemologies, the “view from nowhere”,17 merely obscure 
the specific set of investments, of values, that are in fact present in them 
and in the knowledge constructed from them. That is, where Hobbes,18 
for example, claims to be elucidating universal human nature in his 
description of the “state of nature”, he is actually describing a world 
populated by upper-class white English, or possibly more broadly, European 
men. He is describing a world populated by lots of himself, but because 
he has neglected to consider the possibility of any other viewpoint, 
he has assumed there is no need to do so. From a feminist standpoint, 
one obvious question to ask of Hobbes’ state of nature is not “what form 
of government could bring order out of this violent chaos” (which is 
the question of social contract theory), but “why doesn’t Hobbes notice 
that even in the state of nature all people must have relationships of 
caretaking, at least when they are young?”.
The upshot of this strain of feminist criticism is the claim that a more 
careful attention to the lived experience of more persons shows us that 
our perspectives, and thus our theories, do actually contain and express 
the values that we hold. Hobbes was monarchist and was obviously 
articulating a position in support of monarchy (or something very close 
14  D. Wright, S. Brajtman, Relational and Embodied Knowing, p. 22.
15  D. Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist 
Feminism in the 1980s, in: Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. L.J. Nicholson, London 
1990, p. 202–203.
16  See, for example, H. Longino, Science as Social Knowledge, Princeton, 
NJ 1990; N. Scheman, Who Wants to Know? The Epistemological Value of Values, 
in: (En)Gendering Knowledge: Feminists in Academe, eds. J. Hartman, E. Messer-
Davidow, Knoxville, TN 1991; Feminist Epistemologies; P. Hill Collins, Black Femi-
nist Thought.
17  T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, New York 1989.
18  T. Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 1, Ch. xiii and xiv, New York 1996 [1651].
praktyka4(10)/2013teoretyczna101
Co-writing, Co-knowing...
to it). His theory is clearly informed by this value; it is equally clear-
ly informed by his ignorance of the lived experience of persons of any 
class, gender or race he did not share. He does not recognize, for exam-
ple, that he himself could not have grown to the condition and values 
he held without the support and relation given him by his caretaker(s). 
Feminist theorists, including epistemologists, tend to agree that 
knowing is a process undertaken by persons and, as such, is infused to 
greater or lesser degrees, with the values held by those persons. In gene-
ral, although not consistently or perfectly, feminists intend to and do 
acknowledge the influence of those values on their theorizing. That is, 
having accepted certain premises, such as Hill Collins’ assertion that 
“assessments of an individual’s knowledge claims simultaneously evalu-
ate an individual’s character, values and ethics”19, feminists believe that 
it is part of our responsibility to knowing and to each other to deliber-
ately reflect on our lived experience in order to be clear about what our 
values are, and where they are embodied in our knowing. In our writing 
group, we have come to value narrative or storytelling as a method of 
knowing superior to argumentation; as Wright and Brajtman put it, “it 
is through narrative that we make sense of experience, create commu-
nity, give coherence to life events, and imagine the future. Through nar-
rative, we become human”.20 Consequently our theorizing now often 
contains narrative, or stories, along with a brief statement explaining 
our valuing this type of knowing. 
In addition, two of us have expanded our scientific methodology 
to include the use of storytelling or narrative as a legitimate method of 
discovery. For example, in an effort to understand the value of farmland 
in western North Carolina, our economist used interviews and focus 
groups to complement the use of standard quantitative techniques that 
by themselves are insufficient. When participants were asked to iden-
tify a place on Google Earth, they then told about why this place was 
important to them. This importantly integrates the story-telling into 
traditional scientific methodology.21
Recognition of the centrality of value in knowing is crucial for 
connected knowing because it is difficult to form intimacy, and thus 
the understanding that intimacy enables, without knowing the values of 
19  See P. Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought, p. 218.
20  D. Wright, S. Brajtman, Relational and Embodied Knowing, p. 23.
21  L. Greden Mathews, A. Rex, Incorporating Scenic Quality and Cultural 
Heritage into Farmland Valuation: Results from an Enhance LESA Model, “Journal 
of Conservation Planning” 2011, vol. 7, p. 39–59. For stories see: www2.unca.
edu/farmlandvalues/
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the ones with whom we wish to be intimate. Similarly, it will be much 
harder to participate in knowledge-making with persons whose values 
one does not know. In particular, persons in such a situation are very 
likely to come to a point at which they will find that they disagree in 
some matter of value in a way that wrecks or undermines the knowing 
they are attempting. 
Recognizing the values involved in any particular instance of knowing 
gives rise to a further concern for the possibilities of connected knowing: 
purposiveness. In her article “Ethics of Method: Greasing the Machine 
and Telling Stories”, Joyce Trebilcot relates a story expressing her dismay 
at realizing that some, perhaps many, of her fellow graduate students 
in philosophy felt no particular or personal motivation or purpose in 
studying philosophy, or a specific topic in philosophy.22 How could she 
possibly understand others, she asked, if they had no expressed purpose 
in their pursuit of knowledge?
This point has been made by many others, including Naomi Scheman in 
her article “Who Wants to Know? The Epistemological Value of Values”. 
We summarize part of her argument by saying that purposes in any 
exercise of knowing indicate all of the following: who we are, what we 
value, and whether and by whom we can or should be trusted. 
Although we recognize different purposes for different exercises in 
knowing (e.g., classes, specific papers, research projects, etc.), in our 
group we also see ourselves as having a number of more general, and 
perhaps more profound purposes. For example, one purpose we have is 
to contribute our voices to the construction of knowledge both speci- 
fically and broadly, and thereby contribute to the construction of 
a world that we could more fully embrace. We see this also as connected 
to notions of both activism and obligation, such that at the moment one 
of us became chair of her department, she worked to improve working 
conditions for her specific corner of the campus community. Another is 
currently chair of the faculty senate, in which position she works toward 
the welfare of the university more broadly. These represent instances of 
knowing in many ways: both positions require the seeking and synthe-
sis of many kinds of information as well as a great effort at developing 
intimacy with a variety of colleagues, in order to know, but also to be 
able to put the knowledge to practical purposes. 
Of course, the very fact that our description of connected knowing 
includes that it is directed at meaning rather than truth displays another 
22  J. Trebilcot, Ethics of Method: Greasing the Machine and Telling Stories, in: 
Feminist Ethics, ed. C. Card, Kansas 1991. 
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of our purposes in knowing (as well as our values – we value meaning 
more than truth). Here we can show how connected knowing both 
reveals and is required by our purposes. Meaning is itself socially cre-
ated, and consequently requires engagement with others. An individual 
person cannot make meaning by herself, because if she is truly alone, 
she will not have access to the tools of meaning-making: language, self-
consciousness, interaction with others. Because meaning is social, it 
can be constructed only through engagement, and presumably such 
meaning will be improved through as broad an engagement as possible; 
i.e., through inclusion. As Barbara Thayer-Bacon puts it, “others shape 
our views, [and] others also help us become aware of how views differ… 
we are able to gain more critical leverage the more we experience and 
expose ourselves to others’ standpoints”.23 Further, we recognize that to 
the extent possible, “exposing ourselves” in this way requires effort on 
our part to learn more about differences expressed in those standpoints. 
We agree with Sandra Harding in her assessment of Patricia Hill Collins’ 
important claim that “genuine dialogue across differences” is necessary 
for knowledge making, and for “the development of less partial and dis-
torted belief by any knowledge community”.24 
Equally important, however, is the goal we have of enabling agency. 
Believing that knowing is powerful (not the same as “knowledge is power”), 
and being teachers and mentors, we all share the value and purpose that if 
we have gained understanding that is useful in aiding others either directly 
or indirectly, or in increasing the possibilities for flourishing, for ourselves 
and/or others, then we have an obligation to use that understanding to do 
so. Joey Sprague talks about this kind of obligation on the part of (feminist) 
researchers in social science fields. She argues that “the interests of critical 
researchers in valid knowledge coincide with their values for social justice”, 
and that researchers could see their roles in the production of knowledge as 
enabling the voices and knowledge making of those they study. Researchers 
could, for example, see themselves as working to “make cross-cultural 
understanding, true democracy, or social justice possible” by helping those 
they study, often the disadvantaged, recognize ways in which the “problems 
and irrationalities in their lives are understandable” when they are connected 
with the interests and power imbalances of the dominant class.25
23  B. Thayer-Bacon, A Pragmatist and Feminist Relational (E)pistemology, 
“European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy” 2010, no. II(1), p. 9.
24  S. Harding, Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is Strong Objecti-
vity?, in: Feminist Persepctives on Social Research, p. 54.
25  J. Sprague, Feminist Methodologies for Critical Research: Bridging Differ-
ences, New York 2005, p. 80.
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We try to contribute to flourishing and agency in our own institution. 
For example, we have given several presentations for our institution’s Center 
for Teaching and Learning, which is dedicated to professional develop-
ment. On such occasions we present our group model to new and junior 
faculty to encourage them to consider similar ways of achieving their own 
professional goals. Also, we have all served as individual mentors to new 
and junior faculty, both informally and through our institution’s men-
toring program. We have all engaged in other collaborative projects with 
others in our institution or elsewhere, and several of our members have 
been founding participants in an interdisciplinary teaching and scholar-
ship project called the “Food Cluster”. In this extensive project colleagues 
from a variety of disciplines have worked together to create a cluster of 
related courses that share research and learning projects over the course 
of a semester. Further, out of this work they have developed conference 
papers and published work in which they have been able to include stu-
dents. All these are projects of shared learning and shared knowing, and 
they are valuable to professionals and students alike.
This purpose obviously exhibits our values, our moral commitment: 
we see ourselves as committed to the flourishing of the group, each mem-
ber of the group and the group as a whole, but also to the flourishing 
of others we can reach, such as through publishing or teaching, or with 
whom we interact more directly. Of course we do not claim that we 
can make the world perfect for everyone. What we intend, and work 
toward, is enabling ourselves, and then others, to feel themselves capable 
of making a difference and/or of making meaning in their own lives. 
We believe this is accomplished by the establishment of the kind 
of engagement that creates and fosters trust. We experience ourselves 
as having heightened our own agency as individuals partly because 
we engage in a kind of knowing that is founded on trust, on the kind 
of intimate understanding that comes when we believe we can rely on 
the avowed values and purposes of our partners in engagement. Further, 
our experience as teachers tells us that this is when our students also be-
gin to know differently—to understand with us—when they come to 
trust that we will stand by our avowed values and purposes, our claims 
about wanting to support their agency. In our experience, it is at this 
moment that they come to see themselves as agents engaged with us in 
a project of knowing. And in this kind of knowing, being an engaged agent 
entails being transformed, being changed, becoming. It is here that we 
see most clearly how knowledge is dynamic, active, a process rather than 
a thing to be achieved. It is also here that we see agency as engagement 
– the ability to do, to effect, to change/transform self as well as others.
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Continually becoming knowers
There are many ways to conceptualize the dynamic qualities of engaged 
knowing. One is expressed poignantly in the work of Susan Griffin, where 
she articulates the process of traditional epistemology as needing to 
“pin down” its objects.26 Using the work of naturalist John Audubon 
as an example, she explains that visual, distancing knowing needs also 
to make things hold still in order to be known, just as Audubon kills his 
specimens and literally pins them on boards to study, draw and know 
them. This kind of knowing, because it requires that its objects be as 
separate as its knowers, causes dynamic knowing to be difficult. Such 
epistemologies see their objects as inert and passive, and thus have dif-
ficulty understanding those objects in terms of their ongoing, dynamic 
being.27
Engaged knowing recognizes the dynamic character of the world 
and works within that frame rather than attempting to “fix” it. It’s easy 
to see why this model is unsatisfactory on the terms of traditional epi-
stemology; for example, if knowing changes the knower as well as the 
known, then the knower is not in full control of either her/himself or the 
object of knowledge. This model means that the most we can say about 
our knowing is “this is what it looks like at the moment”, not “this is 
what is”. And if the object of knowledge is changing, then our knowing 
it is never finished, never complete, never fully true in that traditional 
sense. In fact, knowing in this model begins to look like traditional “wo-
men’s work”: the caretaking that is ongoing, the cleaning that is finished 
only to provide a clean surface for the muddy footprints that are left on 
it moments later.28 But if in fact this is what the world is like in lived 
experience, then this kind of knowing is what we need, a knowing that 
can see the clean floor as it is in this moment, understanding that this is 
not the entirety of its “nature” or its story. 
Engaged knowing is transformative, then, in that it recognizes 
the transforming—changing—character of the world, but even more 
in that it enables agency. But here again is the importance of purpose 
and value, because we must be aware of our values and sure of our pur-
poses in order to affect the world responsibly. Perhaps surprisingly, then, 
in the engaged model of knowing, knowing is powerful in the sense that 
it does change things. Perhaps most obviously, gaining knowledge changes 
26  S. Griffin, Woman and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her, San Francisco 2000. 
27  N. Scheman, Who Wants to Know? The Epistemological Value of Values, p. 181.
28  S. Strasser, Never Done: A History of American Housework, New York 1982.
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our “interpretive position”.29 Babbit says that knowing is not merely 
a matter of obtaining the right or full propositional knowledge but rather 
of reconstituting one’s self or situation such that one’s position is unset-
tled and then reset.30 If our values and purposes are not clear, we may slip 
into a knowing that controls rather than enables. In this sense we see the 
importance of both commitment and community: it is our commitment to 
specific values and purposes that keeps us from pursuing and using know-
ing wrongly, and it is our community of engaged knowers and our mutual 
commitment that help us see when that might happen and correct for it. 
Further, it seems clear that commitment is itself a transformative 
engagement, as it literally means that we dedicate ourselves to a particular 
path in our own becoming. In a community of engaged knowers, then, 
we commit to each other and to the transformative possibilities inhe-
rent in opening ourselves to the interconnection that knowing requires. 
But since these are possibilities only, and not certainties, we must rec-
ognize that our knowing will proceed further, and at a more profound 
level, when we can trust. 
Although we cannot—and would not wish to—claim to be finished 
with this knowing work, we can offer a summation at this point: (truly) 
to know simply means to be transformed. That is, connected knowing 
is transformative knowing, in that it is the kind of knowing that we 
allow to touch us, to change us, to transform us. It is knowing that 
accepts, and consequently incorporates the known into the knower to 
some extent, and vice versa. Or, in the words of Scheman, “all know-
ledge is constructed, and the knower is an intimate part of the known”.31 
It is the intimacy of understanding that transforms, in the same way 
that a relationship transforms us, makes us more than what we were 
(albeit sometimes in a negative way, too). To know intimately is to mix 
one’s self with the known, to become at least slightly different because 
of what one is allowing in. And the key here probably is in being able 
to trust, which can be enabled only by moral commitment (you can’t 
trust others if you think they might arbitrarily wrong you). Knowing 
that is grounded in trust is probably the most transformative that knowing 
can be. Further, transformative knowing turns out to be “stronger”, more 
“powerful”, because to transform the self and the known is to have a signi- 
ficant effect on/in the world. So where traditional epistemologies are 
29  S.E. Babbitt, Feminism and Objective Interests: The Role of Transformation 
Experience in Rational Deliberation, in: Feminist Epistemologies, p. 256.
30  Ibid., p. 18.
31  Ibid., p. 137. 
praktyka4(10)/2013teoretyczna107
Co-writing, Co-knowing...
aimed at, and may achieve, control over the known, they cannot effect 
change in the objects/subjects of knowing, and so do not really 
accomplish what they probably intend. Because engaged knowing is not 
interested in control, but relies on commitment and community to 
sustain its agents/agency, it can function in the uncertainty and inde-
terminacy of the world to enable change it does not control (not fully, 
anyway).
Passing it on, and still becoming
Our group has learned to know in an engaged way, and we have expe-
rienced this as a happy transformation. We have experienced it as 
truly agency enhancing in so many ways. It enables us to truly bring 
everything to the project of knowing; every piece of thinking, intu-
ition, experience, whatever, can be placed in front of other knowers 
when we trust that they have our best interests at heart, that they care. 
It enables us to fully accept what others have to offer, and to be open to 
the changes that they suggest (both for our knowing and for us as per-
sons). It enables us to focus on what we can learn and how it can be useful, 
rather than on how we look, although this is also admittedly enabled by 
the privilege of tenure as well. Similarly, it enables us (more easily) to 
remain misfits: to continue working in “marginal” issues and to maintain 
our investments in those issues. On the other hand, it helps us recognize 
our privilege and recognize where/when that privilege is showing in our 
work, and to recognize our obligation to use that privilege when we can 
to support others less privileged, and to work toward the dismantling of 
the structural imbalances of power at work in the world. It enables us 
to sit in the ambiguity that is rich with potential knowing rather than 
being pushed by that discomfort to reach for (false) certainty.
Further, engaged knowing enables a spirit of play. Recognizing 
the incompleteness of our knowing reminds us not to take ourselves 
too seriously. Engaged knowing makes it easy to feel joy in the work 
and successes of others, perhaps especially those in our community of 
knowers. Play is itself a form of engagement, in this case one that says 
“I know what I’m saying is hardly an ultimate truth, but hey—go with 
me a little on this and let’s just see what happens!”.
conclusion
A community of knowers is built more out of what we do than of what 
we are. It’s what we do, the interactions we choose, that forge connec-
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tions between and among us.32 It’s what we commit to that shows our 
values, and lets others see whether they want to be in community with 
us or not. It’s our loyalties that define our purposes and our communi-
ties, and consequently the paths of our knowing, our becoming. And if 
making meaning is the goal of our knowing, then perhaps we can say 
that we are knowing well when we are engaged in the kind of knowing 
work that enables us to contribute to bettering the conditions and sup-
porting the agency of those to whom we know ourselves connected. 
Our group has learned these lessons of knowing over time, and we 
surprise ourselves with the ways in which we evolve as we look back 
on our time together and see that evolution. The recognition of that 
evolution has shown us that we have found a way out of disconnected-
ness; while it does not mean that our work lives are somehow “perfect”, 
it does mean that we have a different perspective on what our purpose 
is. While on the surface, we may have fulfilled the normative expecta-
tions of what good academics do (our resumes are just fine), our careers 
mean something deeper and more personal to us. These deeper meanings 
say to us that continuing to produce knowledge that we understand 
as useful and based on good judgment and practice is important, even 
and perhaps especially when it is seen as marginal or against the grain. 
We also have come to place an even greater value on the notion that 
knowledge is not owned by any individual. It is a process, and as we all 
look at our teaching or our writing we see how it is inflected and influ-
enced by conversations with others—in and outside our writing group. 
This speaks to the humility we see as appropriate to knowledge-making, 
and to the great power of collective knowing.
32  Ibid., p. 185. 
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Tytuł: Współ-pisanie, współ-poznawanie. Transformujące epistemologie
Abstrakt: Nasz artykuł prezentuje wizję tego, jak procesy tworzenia wiedzy oparte 
na współpracy w ramach interdyscyplinarnej grupy piszących przedstawicielek kadry 
akademickiej mogą przekształcić życie zawodowe spędzane w izolacji w rozkwitają-
ce życie. W naszym współtworzeniu wiedzy kluczowe znaczenie posiadają zarówno 
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praktyka krytycznie reflektującego nad sobą snucia opowieści oraz elementy zaan-
gażowania, powiązania i bliskich stosunków. Zauważyłyśmy wspólnie, że elementy 
te zapewniają podstawowe strategie pozwalające na radzenie sobie z izolacją, która 
w innym wypadku stanowiłaby istotną siłę w naszym życiu zawodowym. Nasze zaan-
gażowanie jest zarówno epistemologiczne, jak i etyczne, ponieważ zaangażowałyśmy 
się w wytwarzanie wiedzy, ale jednocześnie każda z nas jako jednostka i podmiot 
etyczny, zaangażowała się w nasze wartości, oraz w to by wcielić je w życie. Wspól-
nie ucząc się o nas samych, wzmocniłyśmy nasze poczucie tożsamości oraz naszą 
zdolność do nawigowania w obrębie naszych ograniczeń i granic. Poprzez wspiera-
jącą, intencjonalną i refleksyjną współpracę poddałyśmy rewizji proces tworzenia 
wiedzy jako coś w sposób fundamentalny społecznego i relacyjnego oraz steorety-
zowałyśmy go jako coś ugruntowanego w specyficzności narracji współdzielonego 
przeżytego doświadczenia.
Słowa kluczowe: storytelling/opowiadanie historii, transformacja, współpraca, 
wytwarzanie wiedzy, zobowiązanie/zaangażowanie
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